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1. Introduction
In an effort to balance conflicting rights and interests, many
tAssistant Professor, Director of the LLM in Human Rights Programme, Deputy
Director of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, the University
of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank the participants at the Symposium on
Pluralism in Asia held at the University of North Carolina School of Law on January 14,
2011, for their insightful comments on an earlier presentation of this paper. Research for
parts of this article was supported by a University of Hong Kong Seed Funding Grant for
Basic Research.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
plural societies attempt to devise measures that protect the identity
rights of minority communities while simultaneously allowing for
the integration and full participation of all groups and individuals
in public life. These objectives are difficult to realize in practice,
however, and the nature of the solutions often depends on the
degree of marginalization experienced by minority groups and the
strength of their claims. This article contends that international
human rights law can inform the process of developing effective
approaches and choosing between (or finding the right mix of)
policies that emphasize accommodation or support integration. At
the same time, the application of human rights standards can
prevent the assimilation of minorities against their will and help
determine where a given policy falls along an accommodation-
assimilation spectrum.
The right to equality, as expressed in core human rights
treaties and interpreted by their monitoring bodies, has particular
resonance for minorities, because they often experience unfair
treatment based on membership in a group identified by
difference.' Reliance on a formal notion of equality, however,
may not effectively address entrenched, systemic discrimination
and may even pressure minorities to assimilate.2 Developments in
international law which clarify that equality must be understood
according to a substantive theory, rather than a "colour-blind"
equal treatment model, have revitalized the principle's potential to
contribute to more effective minority protection.'
China, the most populated multicultural society in the world
with fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups including the
I See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1967, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD];
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
2 See Sandra Fredman, The Future of Equality in Great Britain (Equal
Opportunities Commission, Working Paper No. 5, 2002). Fredman points out that
"[e]arlier ideals behind equality legislation assumed that the aim was to free individuals
from their group characteristics." This notion of equality, however, "ignores the fact that
cumulative disadvantage makes it difficult for members of out-groups to attain the
prerequisite merit criteria. It also disregards the positive aspects of group identity,
aiming at assimilation rather than pluralism."
3 See id.
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Han majority, also faces these challenges.' Since reforms took off
in the early 1980s, China has experienced explosive economic
growth.' Its increasingly global outlook and quest to strengthen
state-building efforts have influenced its approach to minority
claims.6 Rapid development, modernization priorities, and
increasing investment in outlying minority areas have not
alleviated the disaffection of certain groups, and in many cases
have contributed to the intensification of inequalities and unrest in
these regions.
This article considers the applicability of the right to equality
in international human rights law, to the case of the Tibetans in
China whose efforts to achieve self-determination and "genuine"
autonomy represent one of the world's longest running, intractable
ethnic conflicts. Ethnic unrest has continued in Tibetan regions,
and discussions between the Chinese authorities and envoys of the
Tibetan government-in-exile have failed to produce results.'
Studies reveal extreme social and economic inequalities in Tibet
and suggest that China's current strategy continues to place
Tibetan identity at risk.9  This analysis focuses on Chinese
educational policy in particular, especially the teaching and use of
the Tibetan language in the educational context. Language is an
important marker of identity for many minority communities,
including the Tibetans, and provides a key medium through which
members of a group can comprehend, develop, and perpetuate
4 For a discussion of minorities in the Chinese context, see JUNE TEUFEL DREYER,
CHINA'S FORTY MILLIONS: NATIONAL MINORITIES AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE
PRC (1979); COLIN MACKERRAS, CHINA'S ETHNIC MINORITIES AND GLOBALISATION
(2003); ETHNIC MINORITIES IN MODERN CHINA: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN ASIAN
STUDIES (Colin Mackerras ed., 2011).
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id. at 5.
7 See id. at 56-76.
8 See, e.g., Jiangtao Shi, "Middle Way" Unlikely to Bring Softer Stance, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 24, 2008, at 6; RECOMMENDATION OF THE FIRST SPECIAL
GENERAL MEETING CONVENED UNDER ARTICLE 59 OF THE CHARTER (Nov. 22, 2008),
http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=595&articletype=flash&rmenuid=morenews&tab=
1.
9 See Seonaigh MacPherson & Gulbahar Beckett, The Hidden Curriculum of
Assimilation in Modern Chinese Education: Fuelling Indigenous Tibetan and Uygur
Cessation Movements, in CULTURAL EDUCATION-CULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY 103, 116-
18 (Zvi Bekerman & Ezra Kopelowitz eds., 2008).
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their cultural identity.'o Education also plays a prominent role in
this process and may either exacerbate or mitigate conflict while
encouraging ethnic diversity or promoting assimilation."
Therefore, a consideration of the impact of Tibetan education and
language policies demonstrates the tensions involved when
choosing between measures which emphasize the accommodation
of minority rights and those which respond to the imperatives of
integration.
China has become increasingly engaged with the international
human rights system, although questions remain about whether it
has been, or will be, more of a "shaper" or "taker" of human rights
norms.1 China's desire to bolster its legitimacy through this
involvement creates opportunities for discussion of pluralism and
minority rights at the domestic level and enhances the capacity of
the standards to contribute to the resolution of Tibetan claims.13
The Tibetan situation allows for an examination of how a right to
substantive equality may apply in a particularly difficult situation,
and tests the limits of the scope and potential of equality to address
identity claims.
Section II of this article provides an overview of the
international human right to equality and non-discrimination. It
examines (1) the definition of discrimination; (2) the general
obligations of state parties to specific treaties, including the
requirement to take special measures in certain circumstances; and
(3) the content of a right to equality and non-discrimination in
10 See id.
1 See id. at 106-09.
12 Andrew J. Nathan, Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy, 139 CHINA Q. 622,
643 (1994) ("So long as democratization and promotion of rights remain dominant world
trends and China remains outside the trend, human rights are likely to remain a structural
weakness for China's diplomacy. China will be a taker, not a shaper, of emerging world
norms and institutions in the rights field, just as it is in the economic field where it has to
adjust to norms favoured by economically more powerful trading and investment
partners."). See generally ANNE E. KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY (2007) (discussing China's interaction with the
international human rights system); ANNE E. KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE (1999) (discussing China's interaction with
the international human rights system); Sophia Woodman, Human Rights as "Foreign
Affairs ": China's Reporting Under Human Rights Treaties, 35 H.K.L.J. 179 (2005)
(discussing China's interaction with the international human rights system).
13 See Woodman, supra note 12, at 201-03.
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education. Section II references relevant provisions in the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (hereinafter "ICERD"), the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (hereinafter "ICESCR"),
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter
"CRC"). These treaties apply to China and create binding duties
in international law on the Chinese state to ensure non-
discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnicity, among other
markers of identity. 4 This section also analyzes the interpretive
materials produced by the committees and treaty bodies tasked
with monitoring states' implementation of their obligations under
the ICERD, the ICESCR, and the CRC. The interpretive materials
clarify that the right to equality is grounded in a substantive theory
which demands an inquiry into the actual disadvantages facing
particular groups."
Depending on the outcome of that analysis, the right to
equality may also necessitate the reordering of social and
economic hierarchies through the application of positive
measures.16  This sometimes involves preferential treatment to
achieve de facto equality and real participation." Similarly,
equality may require a degree of space, such as geographical
separation and self-government, for the protection and
development of minority identity, but it also guards against
segregation based on racist policies.'" If differential treatment and
appropriate space result in the improvement of a group's status
vis-d-vis a dominant community, this can enhance the group's
ability to integrate without assimilating. Therefore, the right to
substantive equality calls for attention to both the protection of
14 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S 3
[hereinafter CRC]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1, 1,
art. 2, 1.
15 See, e.g., U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 7-8, Aug. 3-28,
2009, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (Sept. 24, 2009) [hereinafter CERD, General
Recommendation No.32]
16 See id. 6, 19-22.
'7 Id.
18 See id. 19-20.
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minority identity rights as well as rights to minority participation
in the larger public arena.
Section III of this article considers the establishment of
autonomy arrangements for minority groups within states as a
potential solution for ethnic conflict. This section likewise
explores whether such mechanisms are consistent with the
principle of substantive equality discussed in Section II.
Autonomy is understood in this article as an arrangement designed
to allow minority communities an amount of self-government to
exercise their collective rights and make their own decisions about
the use of language, religious practices, and other aspects of
culture." In certain situations, autonomy arrangements may serve
as valuable or even necessary tools for actualizing substantive
equality. In some circumstances, including the Tibetan case, the
full realization of minority rights and substantive equality may
necessitate an effective autonomy arrangement.
Section IV considers the application of an international right to
substantive equality to the Tibetan case. It reviews the framework
for regional ethnic autonomy in China, which serves as the
cornerstone of China's minority policy as set out in the 1982
Constitution of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter
"Chinese Constitution"),20 and the 1984 Law on Regional Ethnic
Autonomy (as amended in 2001) (hereinafter "Autonomy Law").21
Section IV also provides an overview of the impact of education
and language policies on the Tibetans' rights to cultural identity
and participation. It examines evidence of systemic discrimination
against the Tibetans and the apparent failure of current measures
to alleviate these inequalities. Language plays a key role in
defining and maintaining Tibetan identity, while the acquisition of
the majority Han Chinese language (putonghua) often determines
access to a variety of resources, including educational and
employment opportunities.22 Education is considered crucial to
19 See generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING CONFLICTING RIGHTS 4 (1996)
(discussing autonomy in constitutional and international law).
20 XIANFA (1982) (China).
21 Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy
(promulgated by Order Number 13 of the President of the People's Republic of China,
May 31, 1984, effective Oct. 1, 1984).
22 See MacPherson & Beckett, supra note 9, at 16-18 (discussing the interactions
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social and economic advancement in Chinese society, and the
language used in education has profound implications for the
protection of identity as well as the ability to function in a society
dominated by a majority language. 23  Therefore, debates about
language policy in education demonstrate the tensions inherent in
resolving minority identity claims while ensuring full
participation.
Section V concludes that current Chinese policies are
inadequate to ensure the realization of substantive equality for the
Tibetans and should be reevaluated with reference to international
human rights standards. Substantive equality may, perhaps
paradoxically, require the strengthening of autonomy in order to
shield the Tibetans from countervailing forces and state priorities
which could undermine their equal enjoyment of identity rights.
An autonomy framework conceptualized and implemented
according to substantive equality objectives may help alleviate
concerns that Tibetan demands for genuine autonomy are
motivated by separatist tendencies.
The flexibility of a substantive equality principle, with its calls
for empirical analysis, constant vigilance, and readjustment of
policies, renders it particularly useful as a device for managing
minority claims. 24 This discussion does not suggest that solutions
are obvious or easily achieved in practice; nor does it suggest that
standards such as self-determination should be abandoned. It
merely proposes that equality can assist, to a greater extent than is
often realized, in the process of identifying and implementing
effective approaches and in alleviating tensions between the
demands of accommodation and integration. This article also
between language, culture, and jobs).
23 Id. at 108-09. ("[Certain forms of] cultural knowledge depend on some formal
of education for transmission and continuity. . . . [A]reas of 'traditional' cultural
knowledge are precisely those subject areas and contents marginalized within modem
curricula and, hence, most threatened by processes of modernization and globalization.
The local language shift and loss that accompanies such curricular changes further
undermines the sustainability of these local cultural knowledges and practices by
creating linguistic, epistemic, and cultural gaps. In this way, changes in education and
curriculum can have a dramatic effect on the sustainability of small non-dominant
cultures.").
24 See generally SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED 179-80 (2008)
(discussing a substantive approach to equality).
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highlights the consistency of some seemingly "unequal" measures,
such as autonomy, with a richer substantive equality doctrine.
II. Substantive Equality in International Human Rights Law
A. Substantive Equality Theory and Minority Rights
This discussion of equality and minority rights alludes to a
broader debate about the extent to which human rights law,
generally conceptualized as a framework for protecting the rights
of individuals, can address group-based minority claims.2 5 This
article takes the position that international human rights standards
allow for flexibility and a contextual approach to implementation,
and they therefore have transformative potential for realizing
collective and individual rights as well as for reconciling identity
claims. Yash Ghai notes that "[r]ights are rarely absolute; there
are various mechanisms for balancing different interests that
inhere in or surround the right."2 6  He observes that "[t]he
framework of rights has been used with considerable success in
mediating competing ethnic and cultural claims" and that "[a]s the
cultural problems of more and more states take on a common
form, a new version of human rights is emerging."2 7 Fernand De
Varennes, writing about minority language rights, similarly argues
that human rights "provide a flexible framework capable of
responding to many of the more important demands on
individuals, minorities or linguistic groups." Yoram Dinstein
clarifies that collective rights may be categorized as "human"
rights and realized within a human rights framework, since group-
based rights are still provided to human beings directly.2 9 Unlike
individual rights, "[c]ollective human rights are afforded to human
beings communally, that is to say, in conjunction with one another
25 See generally Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and
Minorities, 25 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 102, 102-03 (1976) (discussing concepts of collective
and individual claims and their relations to human rights).
26 Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for
Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2000).
27 Id.
28 FERNAND DE VARENNES, LANGUAGE, MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275
(1996).
29 Dinstein, supra note 25, at 102-03.
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or as a group."30
A contextual interpretation of human rights implies that states
may need to take affirmative measures to ensure respect for
collective identity rights and to fulfill their obligations to address
systemic discrimination.' Sandra Fredman comments that the full
realization of human rights requires more than negative duties of
restraint.32 Positive action is necessary, because "[h]uman rights
are based on a much richer view of freedom, which pays attention
to the extent to which individuals are in a position to actually
enjoy those rights."" Fredman's position depends, to some
degree, on whether an individual is a member of a group
characterized by difference.3 4  Formal state neutrality, and the
exercise of restraint which it implies, does not lead to impartial
results where social hierarchies exist.35
The effectiveness of a right to equality in contributing to
human freedom and rights depends to a large extent on the
concepts underpinning the legal standard of equality, as well as the
measures taken by states to implement their obligations under the
standard.3 6 Formal and substantive equality support different and
potentially inconsistent outcomes." Formal equality is "color-
blind," demanding that "likes be treated alike," and can often
30 Id. But see Patrick Macklem, Minority Rights in International Law, 6 INT'L. J.
CONST. L. 531, 533 (2008) ("The claim that a minority population possesses rights that
shield it from assimilative tendencies of a majority population fits uncomfortably with a
conception of international human rights law as a field devoted to protecting essential
features of what it means to be human. . . . [Human rights as a field] is attentive to the
various forms of discrimination and marginalization that minorities may experience.
Beyond this level of protection, however, minority rights run counter to the aspiration of
international human rights law to protect universal, not contingent, features of human
identity.").
31 See FREDMAN, supra note 24, at 9-10.
32 Id. at 9.
33 Id.
34 See id.
35 See id
36 See generally Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin, Introduction to
CONSTITUTING WOMEN: THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 13-14
(Beverly Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2004) (introducing different conceptions of
equality).
37 See id
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dismantle obvious, unjustifiable race-based classifications.38
Substantive equality, however, requires a careful evaluation of the
context and the actual disadvantage faced by identifiable groups
and individuals as a result of their group membership.3 9 When
minority communities attempt to exercise their human rights from
unequal starting points, then the strict application of a formal
equality principle could result in de facto discrimination.40
"Substantive equality [however] tries to identify [and correct]
patterns of oppression and subordination." 4 ' A robust equality
principle, therefore, requires an empirical assessment of the
relative disadvantage of the group concerned, the past and ongoing
discrimination it has faced, the impact of apparently neutral
measures on relevant communities, and other factors, such as the
uniqueness of the group's culture, and, in the extreme, possible
threats to its survival.42
Fredman advocates for a vision of equality aimed at achieving
four primary objectives, which reflect a substantive theory.43
These include: (1) the "promot[ion of] respect for the equal dignity
and worth of all, [to] redress[] stigma, stereotyping, humiliation,
and violence because of membership of an out-group"; (2) the
"accommodation and positive affirmation and celebration of
identity within community"; (3) the "break[ing of] the cycle of
disadvantage associated with status-groups"; and (4) the
"facilitat[ion of] full participation in society.4 4 Fredman adds that
"[p]articipation is a multi-layered concept" and that "equality law
should specifically compensate for the absence of political power
of minority groups."45 Achieving these goals may require positive
duties, special measures, and other forms of adaptation and
accommodation. 46  This enriched understanding of equality can
enhance the principle's transformative potential and its ability to
38 See generally id. (describing formal equality in the context of gender issues).
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 See generally Baines & Rubio-Marin, supra note 36, at 13-14.
42 Id. (discussing definition of substantive equality).
43 FREDMAN, supra note 24, at 179.
44 Id. at 179-80.
45 Id. at 180.
46 Id. at 179.
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support the resolution of minority claims, even, or perhaps
especially, claims made by groups facing particularly extreme
marginalization.47
B. International Instruments
Fredman's conception of equality is reflected in the
international legal right to equality and non-discrimination, as set
out in the texts of key human rights treaties, and as interpreted by
the U.N. human rights treaty monitoring bodies.4 8 Equality is a
foundational principle of the human rights regime and is
articulated in most of the core human rights instruments. 4 9 This
discussion focuses on the prohibition of discrimination in the
ICERD, which includes a free standing right to racial equality;50
the ICESCR, which requires substantive non-discrimination in the
guarantee of social and economic rights;" and the CRC, which
also requires non-discrimination.5 2 These treaties obligate states to
secure substantive equality on the basis of ethnicity or race, and
therefore are relevant to the protection of racial and ethnic
minorities' rights." These treaties also apply to China and create
binding duties on the Chinese state as a matter of international
law. 54
47 See id at 179-80.
48 See, e.g., CRC, supra note 14, art. 2, 2-3; ICESR, supra note 14, art. 2, 1-
2; ICERD, supra note 1, art. 2, 1-2.
49 See generally U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Oct. 22,
2011) (introducing human rights and equality).
50 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 5.
51 ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 2, 2.
52 CRC, supra note 14, art. 2, 1.
53 See id.; ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 2, 2; ICERD, supra note 1, art. 5. It
should be noted that Article 2(1) and Article 26 of the ICCPR are also relevant and
contain rights to equality and non-discrimination provisions which stand alone and are
contingent on the rights contained in the Covenant. Article 22 of the ICCPR provides an
explicit right for persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities not to be
denied "the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."
This article will not consider these standards in depth, however, since China has not yet
ratified the ICCPR, despite having signed the treaty in 1998. ICCPR, supra note 1.
54 CRC, supra note 14; ICESCR, supra note 14.
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The ICERD was adopted in 1965 and entered into force in
1969." It prohibits all forms of racial discrimination, as defined in
Article 1, and places both positive and negative duties on states to
ensure racial equality.56 China acceded to the ICERD in 1981 and
has submitted six reports to the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination pursuant to Article 9," which requires states
to report every two years and to provide details of "the legislative,
judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted
and which give effect to the provisions of th[e] Convention
[ICERD]."
The ICESCR was adopted in 1966, entered into force in 1976,
and is one of three documents constituting the International Bill of
Human Rights." The ICESCR recognizes core economic, social,
and cultural rights, such as the rights to work, to social security, to
an "adequate standard of living, . . . to enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health," and to
education.60 Article 2 sets out the general obligations on states
parties to "take steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the [ICESCR] rights... by all appropriate means."6 1
55 ICERD, supra note 1. See generally MICHAEL BANTON, INTERNATIONAL ACTION
AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1996) (discussing the history of the ICERD); Kevin
Boyle & Anneliese Baldaccini, A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights
Approaches to Racism, in DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE OF RACISM
135, 149-76 (Sandra Fredman ed., 2001) (discussing the history of the ICERD).
56 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1, 1-2, art. 2, 1.
57 U.N., REPORT STATUS BY COUNTRY,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsflNewhyVAllSPRByCountry?OpenView&Start=I&Cou
nt-250&Expand=36.4#36.4 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
58 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 9, 1 1. See generally Patrick Thomberry, Confronting
Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REv. 239, 244-46 (2005)
(discussing the reporting process). The Convention contains more frequent reporting
obligations than other human rights treaties, and overdue reports have been a persistent
problem for the Committee, which sometimes considers combined reports from states.
Boyle & Baldaccini, supra note 55, at 170-71. For example, China's most recent report
integrated its tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth reports in one document. U.N.,
REPORT STATUS BY COUNTRY, supra note 57.
59 ICESCR, supra note 14; U.N. Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of
Human Rights (1996) (noting that the other two documents included in the bill are the
UDHR and the ICCPR).
60 ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 6, T 1, art. 9, art. 11, T 1, art. 12, 11, art. 13, 11.
61 Id. art. 2, T 1.
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States also have an immediate obligation to ensure that the rights
in the ICESCR "will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
",62
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
China ratified the Covenant in March 2001 and has submitted two
reports to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
in accordance with Articles 16 and 17.63
The CRC was adopted in 1989, entered into force in 1990, and
has achieved near universal acceptance.64 Article 2 sets out a
general non-discrimination provision, which is similar to its
counterpart in the ICESCR.6 5 It mandates that "States Parties shall
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the [CRC] to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind,
irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status."" China ratified the CRC in March 1992 and has
submitted three state reports to the Committee on the Rights of the
Child pursuant to Article 44.67
The provisions in these treaties, especially when read
alongside the relevant interpretive materials produced by the treaty
bodies, clarify that a right to equality and non-discrimination in
the ICERD, the ICESCR, and the CRC demands the realization of
substantive equality.68 This is evident from the definition of
discrimination, which includes indirect and unintentional
discrimination, the positive duties on states to eliminate de facto
discrimination and achieve substantive equality, and the
requirement to take special measures targeting individuals or
62 Id. art. 2, T 2. This general obligation of non-discrimination in the ICESCR
essentially mirrors its counterpart provision in the ICCPR.
63 ICESCR, supra note 14; U.N., REPORT STATUS BY COUNTRY, supra note 57.
64 CRC, supra note 14.
65 See id. 11.
66 Id
67 Id.; U.N., REPORT STATUS BY COUNTRY, supra note 57.
68 See, e.g., U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9, Turkmenistan,
Aug. 2-19, 2005, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/TKM/CO/5, 67th Sess. (Nov. 1 2005) [hereinafter
Turkmenistan].
2011] 13
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
groups when warranted by the circumstances.6 9 The following
analysis more thoroughly reviews these standards and
contemplates their implications for the protection of collective
minority claims and for the securing of rights to participation
without sacrificing minority identity.
C. The Meaning ofDiscrimination
The meaning of "discrimination," as expressed in the human
rights treaties and interpreted by the treaty bodies, clearly supports
a substantive equality doctrine.70 The word implies discrimination
in both its direct and indirect forms, therefore recognizing that
sometimes formal equal treatment can nevertheless violate the
right to equality." It also specifies that special measures designed
to transform social and economic hierarchies-which affect
groups and individuals in order to achieve substantive equality-
are not discriminatory and should not be characterized as
exceptions to the non-discrimination principle.7 2
The concept of "racial discrimination" is explicitly elaborated
in the ICERD and further clarified by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.7 3 Although the ICESCR
and the CRC prohibit discrimination in the application of the
rights under those instruments, the term is not defined within their
texts. Their monitoring bodies, the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, have reflected on its meaning, however, when clarifying
state obligations under those instruments.
Article 1 of the ICERD defines racial discrimination, the
ICERD's core concept, as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, or any other field of public life.74
69 See CRC, supra note 14; ICESCR, supra note 14; ICERD, supra note 1.
70 See, e.g., ICERD, supra note 1.
71 See, e.g., id.
72 See, e.g., id art. 1, T 4.
73 See, e.g., Turkmenistan, supra note 68.
74 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1, 1.
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Such a broad understanding of discrimination, as well as the
meaning of "race," which includes identities based on ethnic and
cultural characteristics, social background, and color, places the
concerns of many ethnic groups squarely within the ICRD's remit
and renders the treaty particularly relevant to the protection of
minority rights.15 In this regard, the Committee has commented in
its concluding observations on state reports that the ICRD
obligates states to adopt positive measures to protect the identity
of minority communities and prevent assimilation."
The words "purpose or effect" in the ICERD's definition
indicate that the treaty covers both intentional and unintentional
acts as well as direct and indirect discrimination.7  Indirect
discrimination occurs when the application of apparently neutral
criteria disproportionately and negatively impacts members of a
particular racial or ethnic group, sometimes requiring group-based
approaches to eradicate structural inequalities." The prohibition
of indirect and unintentional discrimination demonstrates the
ICERD's recognition that strict neutrality and formal equal
7 See generally Kristen Henrard, The Protection of Minorities Through the
Equality Provisions in the UN Human Rights Treaties: The UN Treaty Bodies, 14 INT'L
J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RIGHTS, 141, 141-42 (2007) (discussing the relevance of
human rights treaties to the protection of minority rights and arguing that the ICERD is
of particular importance to minorities).
76 See, e.g., Turkmenistan, supra note 68, 1 12 ("[The] policies of forced
assimilation amount to racial discrimination and constitute grave violations of the
Convention. [The Committee] urges the State party to respect and protect the existence
and cultural identity of all national and ethnic minorities within its territory."); see also
CERD, General Recommendation 21: Right to Self-determination, 1 5, U.N. Doc.
A/51/18 (Aug. 23, 1996) ("In accordance with article 2 of the [ICERD] and other
relevant international documents, Governments should be sensitive towards the rights of
persons belonging to ethnic groups. . . . Also, Governments should consider, within their
respective constitutional frameworks, vesting persons belonging to ethnic or linguistic
groups . . . where appropriate, with the right to engage in activities which are particularly
relevant to the preservation of the identity of such persons or groups."); Kristin Henrard,
supra note 75, at 142 ("In its Concluding Observations on Turkmenistan of 2005, the
Committee even remarked that the prohibition of racial discrimination actually entails
not only a prohibition of forced assimilation, but also a positive duty to protect and
promote the cultural identity of minorities.").
77 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
78 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General
Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (art. 2,
2, of the ICESCR), 20, May 4-22, 2009, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009)
[hereinafter CESCR, General Comment No. 20]
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treatment are insufficient to address all forms of discrimination.7 9
An evaluation of context, such as the impact of group membership
on accessing resources, is necessary.so The Committee notes that:
The term "non-discrimination" does not signify the necessity of
uniform treatment when there are significant differences in
situation between one person or group and another, or, in other
words, if there is an objective and reasonable justification for
differential treatment. To treat in an equal manner persons or
groups whose situations are objectively different will constitute
discrimination in effect. . . . The Committee has also observed
that the application of the principle of non-discrimination
requires that the characteristics of groups be taken into
consideration.
The ICERD also indicates what racial discrimination does not
include.82 Article 1(2) excludes distinctions between citizens and
non-citizens, although the Committee has interpreted this
provision narrowly.83 Article 1(4) clarifies that:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or
individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be
deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such
measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not
be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have
been achieved.84
79 Id
80 See CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, supra note 15.
81 Id. 18.
82 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
83 See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/iRev.7/Add.I (May 4, 2005) [hereinafter CERD].
84 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1(4) (emphasis added).
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If evaluated according to a formal equality theory, special
measures that constitute differential treatment based on racial
classifications could appear to contravene the equality principle."
The ICERD's qualification of the definition of discrimination
clarifies, however, that race-based differentiation complying with
the special measures criteria is not discriminatory.86 In other
words, "differential treatment" is not the same as
"discrimination."87  "Differential" treatment must also be
distinguished from "preferential" treatment since the latter term
implies that the group for which the special measures are designed
is in a better position than another group (generally the majority)
once the measures are applied." Use of this sort of terminology in
relation to special measures belies a formal, rather than a
substantive, understanding of equality.8 9 Because of the difference
in power relations between groups, special measures targeted at
the disadvantaged community are actually designed to "equalize"
rather than raise one group above another.9 0 In this sense, they are
transformative and such an interpretation opens the door for
affirmative policies aimed at advancing the situation of a
marginalized group relative to the majority.9 '
The Committee explains that the draft text of Article 1(4) was
amended from "should not be deemed racial discrimination" to
"shall not be deemed racial discrimination." 92 It follows that
differential treatment designed to rectify de facto inequalities is
not discriminatory by definition, and "special measures are not an
exception to the principle of non-discrimination but are integral to
85 See generally WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (Clarendon Press 1983) (noting that the Commission amended
the Sub-Commission's original text to make clear that the measures adopted for the
development and protection of racial groups or individuals should not be deemed to be
preferential or discriminatory).
86 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1(4).
87 Id.
88 See generally CERD, General Recommendation 21, supra note 76, IT 11-18
(discussing the concept of special measures, how they differ from permanent rights, and
how countries can implement them).
89 Id.
90 Id. I11.
91 Id.
92 Id. 20 (emphasis added).
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its meaning and essential to [its] project of eliminating racial
discrimination and advancing human dignity and effective
equality."" In his commentary on the ICERD, McKean similarly
explains that special measures are necessary for the realization of
de facto equality.94 He writes that a definition of discrimination
"which incorporates the notion of temporary special measures, not
as an exception to the principle but as a corollary to it,
demonstrates ... the method by which the twin concepts of
discrimination and minority protection can be fused into the
principle of equality." 9 5
The Committee elaborates that the phrase "adequate
advancement" in Article 1(4) implies that special measures entail
"goal-directed programmes which have the objective of alleviating
and remedying disparities in the enjoyment of human rights ...
affecting particular groups and individuals, protecting them from
discrimination." 96 It clarifies that these include, but are not limited
to, "persistent or structural disparities and de facto inequalities
resulting from the circumstances of history that continue to deny
to vulnerable groups and individuals the advantages essential for
the full development of the human personality."9 7 Proof of
historical discrimination is not required to justify special
measures, and "the emphasis should be placed on correcting
93 CERD, General Recommendation 21, supra note 76, 20.
94 McKEAN, supra note 85, at 159. But see PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 266 (1991). In response to McKean's statement,
Thomberry argues against an overly broad understanding and cautions that the ICERD's
"limited concession in the definition of discrimination in favor of disadvantaged groups
should not be idealized into a substitute for the protection of minorities, which is a wider
notion." While Thornberry is certainly correct that the special measures provisions are
limited and may be insufficient on their own to fully protect the rights of minority
communities, the provisions are nonetheless significant since their inclusion clarifies the
ICERD's requirement of substantive equality. Since a substantive equality theory takes
difference into account and requires the transformation of social and economic
hierarchies based on group membership, it has important implications for identity rights.
Substantive equality is consistent with minority rights so long as "separate" rights do not
lead to policies of segregation that are supported by theories of racial superiority.
95 See McKEAN, supra note 85, at 159; see also Wojciech Sadurski, Gerhardy v.
Brown v. the Concept of Discrimination: Reflections on the Landmark Case that Wasn't,
11 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (1986) (discussing the distinction between special measures as an
exception to equality and special measures as part of a substantive equality theory).
96 CERD, General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 76, 1 22.
97 Id
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present disparities and on preventing further imbalances from
arising."98
Although the ICESCR does not explicitly define the term
"discrimination," the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights provides a definition based on Article 1 of the
ICERD and other specialized human rights treaties:
[D]iscrimination constitutes any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is
directly or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of
discrimination and which has the intention or effect of nullifying
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of Covenant rights.99
The Committee clarifies that discrimination includes both its
direct and indirect forms,'o and that states are obligated to
eliminate both formal and substantive discrimination.'o' In this
regard, it notes that the enjoyment of human rights under the
ICESCR often depends on whether a person is a "member of a
group characterized by the prohibited grounds of
discrimination."' 2 In order to eliminate de facto discrimination,
states must pay "sufficient attention to groups of individuals which
suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead of merely
comparing the formal treatment of individuals in similar
situations.""0 '
Like the ICERD, the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights recognizes that special measures are legitimate and
non-discriminatory and that states may be obligated to adopt them
"to the extent that they represent reasonable, objective and
proportional means to redress de facto discrimination and are
discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably
achieved."' 04 The Committee goes further than the Committee on
98 Id.
99 CESCR, supra note 78, 7.
100 Id. T 10(b).
101 Id. 8.
102 Id. 8(b).
103 Id. 8(b).
104 CESCR, supra note 78, 9.
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the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, however, by noting that
special measures must sometimes be of a more permanent
nature. 05
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also affirmed
that non-discrimination requires attention to context and has also
noted that states must actively "identify individual children and
groups of children the recognition and realization of whose rights
may demand special measures." 0 6  This process of ascertaining
the existence of discrimination requires the collection of necessary
data.' Like the other treaty bodies, the Committee emphasizes
that combating discrimination does not necessarily require
identical treatment. Instead, the Committee refers to the Human
Rights Committee, which has "underlined the importance of
taking special measures in order to diminish or eliminate
conditions that cause discrimination."' 08
D. States' General Obligations and Special Measures
The ICERD, ICESCR, and CRC all require that state parties
take positive steps to ensure substantive equality for groups and
individuals.'0 9  As noted above, they also obligate states,
depending on the context, to take "special measures" which, by
definition, are not "discriminatory" even if they involve different
treatment for particular racial groups.1 o The relevant provisions
and treaty body interpretations contain express limitations on
special measures.' For example, special measures cannot
105 Id. 9 ("Such positive measures may exceptionally, however, need to be of a
permanent nature, such as interpretation services for linguistic minorities and reasonable
accommodation of persons with sensory impairments in accessing health-care
facilities.").
106 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5: General
Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 4, 42,
44(6), Sept. 19-Oct. 3, 2003, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 2003).
107 Id.
10 Id. (citing Human Rights Comm., General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (Nov. 10, 1989)).
109 CRC, supra note 14, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 14, arts. 2-5; ICERD supra note
1, arts. 8-16.
110 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
I 11I See, e.g., CESCR, supra note 78, 9 ("[Special] measures are legitimate to the
extend that they . . . are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably
achieved.").
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continue after their objectives have been achieved.1 2 However,
these qualifications are intended as safeguards against forms of
racial segregation based on theories of racial superiority (such as
apartheid), which undermine the enjoyment of human rights, and
should not be read as constraints on the protection of minority
identity rights." 3  They do not undermine the potential of
substantive equality to support a workable balance between the
accommodation of identity and rights to participate in society as a
whole."' Instead, they can be understood as a defense against the
abuse and misuse of special measures by those who wish to
advance racist policies."s
Article 2 of the ICERD sets out states' general obligations."'
According to Article 2(1), states must pursue "by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial
discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among
all races."' ' These objectives require both proactive steps and
adherence to duties of restraint."' States must refrain from
engaging in any discriminatory acts or practices or from
sponsoring, defending or supporting racial discrimination by any
persons or organizations."' They must also actively "take
effective measures to review . .. policies, and to amend, rescind or
nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating
or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists."l2 0 States
must "prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means,
112 See, e.g., ICERD supra note 1, art. 1(4) ("[Special measures] shall not be
continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.").
113 See id. art. 1(4) (explaining that special measures "shall in no case entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups").
114 See CERD, General Recommendation 21, supra note 76, at 6-9 (interpreting
"special measures" and limiting the scope of acceptable motivations for enacting special
measures).
115 See id. 21 (explaining that by expressing that the "sole purpose" of special
measures is to ensure equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
Convention limited the scope of acceptable motivations for special measures, thereby
defending against misuse of special measures for racist motivations).
116 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 2.
117 Id. art. 2(l).
11 Id. art.2.
'19 Id. art. 2(l)(a), (b).
120 Id. art. 2(1)(c).
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including legislation as required by circumstances, racial
discrimination by any persons, group or organization. 12 1
These duties include special and concrete measures in the
social, economic, cultural or other fields which states must take
"when the circumstances so warrant" in order to "ensure the
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing
them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 2 2  Special measures are limited in the
sense that they "shall in no case entail as a consequence the
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial
groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved."' 23
The Committee confirms the mandatory nature of the measures
and explains the importance of evaluating the particular situation
when determining whether special measures are required.124 The
phrase "when the circumstances so warrant" provides "context for
the application of the measures . . .. The phrase has, in principle,
an objective meaning in relation to the disparate enjoyment of
human rights by persons and groups in the State party and the
ensuing need to correct such imbalances."l 25  The language of
Article 2(2) signals that states must continually assess a group's
relative disadvantage, based on sound empirical data, to determine
whether special measures are required and whether any special
measures previously taken have achieved their objectives.126
The Committee has consistently emphasized this concern
within the context of its comments on state reports.127 The mere
existence of special measures is not enough-they must be
evaluated for their necessity and their ability to achieve the
121 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 2(l)(c).
122 Id. art. 2(2).
123 Id
124 GENERAL RECOMMENDATION No. 32, supra note 15, 30 ("The use in the
paragraph of the verb 'shall' in relation to taking special measures clearly indicates the
mandatory nature of the obligation.").
125 Id
126 See generally id (discussing the language of art. 2(2) of the ICERD).
127 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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Convention's objectives. 128 For example, in its 2008 Concluding
Observations on Fiji's report, the Committee expressed its view
that "the need for special measures, in sectors such as education
and employment, may not be based on a realistic appraisal of the
current situation of the different communities" and encouraged the
state party to "engage in a data-gathering exercise to ensure that
special measures are designed and implemented on the basis of
need, and that their implementation is monitored and regularly
evaluated."'2 9
The application and scope of the special measures provisions
are restricted, however.'3 0 The Committee explains that "the
operation of special measures is essentially functional and goal-
related: the measures should cease to be applied when the
objectives for which they were employed-the equality goals-
have been sustainably achieved."'3 1 There is no specified time
limit within which these goals must be achieved, and "[tihe length
of time permitted for the duration of the measures will vary in
light of their objectives, the means utilized to achieve them, and
the results of their application."' 3 2 It is conceivable that special
measures may be necessary for long periods, even indefinitely,
depending on the degree of exclusion faced by the community
concerned. The key is an evaluation of the exigencies of the
situation. Where a group faces severe marginalization or its
cultural identity is at risk, as is arguably the case in Tibet, special
measures may take longer to achieve substantive equality. The
128 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
129 U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations: Fiji, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/FJI/CO/17, (Mar. 2008), 1 17 [hereinafter Fiji];
see also U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations: Republic of Moldova, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/MDA/CO/7, (Mar. 2008), $
16; [hereinafter Republic of Moldova] U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Ethiopia, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ETH/CO/15,
(June 2007), 25; U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Concluding Observations: Israel, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/1 3, (June 2007), 8; U.N.
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations:
Ukraine, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/UKR/CO/18, (February 2007), 14 [hereinafter Ukraine]
130 See CERD, General Recommendation 32, supra note 15, T 26-27 (noting that
these provisions have therefore been interpreted by the Committee as "temporary" in
nature).
'31 Id. 27.
132 Id.
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main consideration is context and the limitation "implies the
need ... for a continuing, system of monitoring their application
and results using, as appropriate, quantitative and qualitative
methods of appraisal."l 3 3
It is arguable that these limitations are already implicit in the
purpose of special measures, as set out in the ICERD, and
therefore their explicit mention may appear redundant and
unnecessary. Their inclusion, and thus their emphasis, is
understandable in light of the historical environment within which
the ICERD was drafted and the treaty's clear concern with
tackling apartheid, colonialism, and other racist policies.134 This
focus is evident in the text of the Convention as Article 3 requires
that state parties "particularly condemn racial segregation and
apartheid." Article 3 further obligates state parties to "prevent,
prohibit, and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories
under their jurisdiction.""'
The restrictive language in ICERD Article 1(4) explicitly
limited the extent of the special measures by mandating that they
should not "lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different
racial groups."' 36 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination explained that "[t]his provision is narrowly drawn
to refer to 'racial groups' and calls to mind the practice of
Apartheid referred to in Article 3 . . . and to practices of
segregation referred to in that article and in the preamble to the
Convention.""
Special measures and minority rights are distinct from racial
segregation in this sense. The Committee explains that:
[t]he notion of inadmissible 'separate rights' must be
distinguished from rights accepted and recognized by the
international community to secure the existence and identity of
groups such as minorities, indigenous peoples and other
categories of person whose rights are similarly accepted and
'33 Id. 35.
134 See generally ICERD, supra note I (condemning colonization, apartheid, and
racial segregation in preamble and throughout the document).
135 Id. art. 3.
136 Id. art. 1(4).
137 CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, supra note 15, 26.
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recognized within the framework of universal human rights.1 38
Some have noted, however, that the ICERD's apparent
emphasis on integration could interfere with respect for minority
identity rights. 139 Kevin Boyle and Anneliese Baldaccini point out
that "Article 2(2) provides no safeguards against the use of
measures that, in promoting the adequate development of racial
groups, constitute assimilationist policies."'4 0 Additionally,
Article 2(1)(e) obligates states "to encourage, where appropriate,
integrationalist multi-racial organizations and movements and
other means of eliminating barriers between races, and to
discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial division." 4 '
References to integration, like the limitations on special
measures, must be understood in light of the ICERD's context and
purpose. This includes the ICERD's primary concern with
decolonization and racist segregation policies at the time of its
drafting.142 If integration, as understood in the ICERD, is designed
to prevent apartheid-like regimes, it could therefore be consistent
with the protection of minority identity when such protections
conform to the aims of substantive equality and human rights. As
such, the ICERD does not allow the implementation of measures
that result in the assimilation of a minority group or its members
138 Id. The practice of the CERD confirms this approach. For example, when
commenting on policies in the Czech Republic which led to the overrepresentation of
Roma children in special schools for students with learning disabilities, the Committee
cautioned that "special measures for the advancement of certain groups are legitimate
provided that they do not lead, in purpose or in practice, to the segregation of
communities." The CERD reaffirmed the need for an assessment of context by
recommending a review of "the methodological tools used to determine the cases in
which children are to be enrolled in special schools so as to avoid indirect discrimination
against Roma children on the basis of their cultural identity." In this case, the de facto
segregation of Roma students undermined their human rights rather than supported a
positive promotion of identity. See U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Czech, 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CZE/CO/7
(Apr. 11, 2007).
139 See, e.g., Boyle & Baldaccini, supra note 55, at 158.
140 Id.
I41 Id.
142 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, art. 31 (requiring that a treaty be interpreted in good faith and within the context of
the treaty's objective).
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against their will.143 Preventing assimilation, however, entails a
careful balancing exercise and attention to the actual disadvantage
of a group in accordance with substantive equality.1" As Robert
Dunbar observes, while "an integrationist policy towards
minorities is not necessarily inconsistent with cultural and
linguistic plurality .... [T]he borderline between integrationist
and assimilationist policies is a murky one, at best."' 45 An
equality principle grounded in a theory of human rights based on a
richer understanding of human freedom, as proposed by Fredman,
can assist with delineating these boundaries and achieving an
appropriate equilibrium.14 6
At the same time, policies which may result in a degree of
separation for a minority community from the rest of society (such
as autonomy mechanisms as discussed in Section III) could be
necessary to guarantee the "protection" and equal enjoyment of
human rights (including minority rights). This is especially true
when minorities face serious threats to their identity. When
designed appropriately, these measures will be consistent with
achieving the objective of non-assimilationist integration espoused
by the ICERD.' 47 In other words, separation (as distinct from
"segregation") allows minority groups the opportunity to freely
enjoy their culture, language, and religion. As such, separation
may be the best response to ensure a group's "adequate
development and protection ... for the purpose of guaranteeing
them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 48
The Committee's work reveals the ICERD's concern with
ensuring the participation and representation of minority
communities in public life as well as with preserving ethnic
143 See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Minority Rights:
International Standards and Guidance for Implementation, U.N. Doc. HRIPUB/l 0/3, at
10 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter OHCHR].
144 See id. ("The implementation of the rights of persons belonging to minorities has
highlighted the need not only to understand and redress inequality but also to
accommodate difference and diversity.").
145 Robert Dunbar, Minority Language Rights in International Law, 50 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 90, 104 (2001).
146 FREDMAN, supra note 24, at 9.
147 See OHCHR, supra note 143, at 10.
148 ICERD, supra note 1, at art. 2(2).
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identity.'4 9 The work confirms that special measures may assist
with these goals and support both integration (in the sense of
participation rather than assimilation) and the protection of
minority identity; these objectives are not mutually exclusive.'s
The reference to both groups and individuals in the special
measures provisions, coupled with a substantive understanding of
equality and non-discrimination, strengthens this interpretation
and indicates that equality sometimes necessitates strategies that
target collective entities."'
E. Non-discrimination in the Enjoyment of a Right to
Education
International human rights instruments also set out a
framework for the protection of the right to education and non-
discrimination in the exercise of that right. These protections
require the effective balancing of identity and participation rights
in the education context.
Article 13 of the ICESCR elaborates on the content of a right
to education. It describes the right as including free and
149 See OHCHR, supra note 143, at 4 ("minorities have traditionally highlighted
their rights to have their existence as a group protected, their identity recognized and
their effective participation in public life and respect for their cultural, religious and
linguistic pluralism safeguarded.").
150 See, e.g., Fiji, supra note 129, 18 (recommending that Fiji consider adopting
"measures to ensure that all ethnic groups are duly represented in State institutions and
the public administration, including special measures aimed at achieving adequate
representation of all communities, particularly in the military. . . ."); Republic of
Moldova, supra note 129, 12 (requiring Moldova to involve the community concerned
in the implementation and monitoring of any plan to institute special measures); see also
Ukraine, supra note 129, 18 (recommending that the Ukraine "take special measures
for the protection and preservation of the cultural heritage of minorities such as the
Crimean Tatars, the Karaites and the Roma."); OHCHR, General Comment No. 23, art.
27,17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994) (stating that the protection of
minority rights is consistent with their right to participation. The enjoyment of cultural
rights "may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the
effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect
them.").
151 CERD, General Recommendation No. 32, supra note 15, 1 34 ("Beneficiaries of
special measures under article 2, paragraph 2 may be groups of individuals belonging to
such groups. The advancement and protection of communities through special measures
is a legitimate objective to be pursued in tandem with respect for the rights and interests
of individuals.").
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compulsory primary education, generally accessible secondary
education, and equally accessible higher education-all of these
without discrimination. 5 2 Article 13 also sets out the core values
which education must encompass and promote. These include (1)
"the full development of the human personality" and sense of
dignity; (2) strengthening "respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms"; (3) enabling "all persons to participate
effectively in a free society"; (4) "promoting understanding,
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all 'ethnic' groups,
as well as nations and racial and religious groups"; and (5)
furthering the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance
of peace.'5 3
Article 28 of the CRC also provides for a right to education,
while Article 29 contains a similar, but more elaborate list of aims
toward which education must be directed. 5 4 The Committee on
the Rights of the Child explains:
The child's right to education is not only a matter of access (art.
28) but also of content. An education with its contents firmly
rooted in the values of article 29 (1) is for every child an
indispensable tool for her or his efforts to achieve in the course
of her or his life a balanced, human rights-friendly response to
the challenges that accompany a period of fundamental change
driven by globalization, new technologies and related
152 ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 13(2).
153 Id. art. 13(1). CESCR has proposed a framework for understanding states'
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill a right to education. Known as the "4-As," this
system of analysis reveals that in order to comply with the ICESCR, education must be
available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable. "Acceptability" means that the form
and substance of the teaching methods and curricula be relevant, culturally appropriate,
and of good quality, and "adaptability" means that the education system and curriculum
must conform to internationally recognized human rights aims. See Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, The Right to
Education, art. 13, 1 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999); see also Preliminary
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Ms. Katarina Tomasevski,
submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/33, 42-
74, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/49 (Jan. 13, 1999); SUSAN MARKS & ANDREW CLAPHAM,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 136-44 (2005).
154 See generally Committee on the Rights of the Child [General Comment No. 1:
The Aims of Education] U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 (Apr. 17, 2001) (elaborating on the
educational aims of the CRC).
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phenomena. 155
The values articulated in Article 29 are relevant to this
discussion since they inform education's content and therefore its
ability to contribute to the process of balancing the priorities of
protecting cultural identity and promoting integration. One of the
objectives of education is to support "respect for the child's ...
cultural identity, language and values" as well as "for the national
values of the country in which the child is living, the country from
which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from
his or her own."l5 6 Education must also be directed toward "[t]he
preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the
spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and
friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups
and persons of indigenous origin."' 57 The Committee notes that
"[a]t first sight, some of [these] diverse values" might appear to be
potentially conflicting in certain circumstances."' Attempts "to
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
peoples ... might not always be automatically compatible with
policies designed . .. to develop respect for the child's own
cultural identity, language and values. . . . ."'9 It adds, however,
that "part of the importance of this provision lies precisely in its
recognition of the need for a balanced approach to education and
one which succeeds in reconciling diverse values through dialogue
and respect for difference."' 60
The ICESCR, the CRC, and the ICERD each guarantee a right
to education without discrimination in accordance with a
substantive equality principle.' 6 ' The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has clarified that the immediate
obligation of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights
155 Id. 3.
156 CRC, supra note 14, art. 29(1)(c).
157 Id. art. 29(1)(d).
158 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 1, supra note 154,
1 4.
159 Id.
160 Id
161 See CRC, supra note 14, art. 28-29; ICESCR, supra note 14, art. 13(1); ICERD,
supra note 1, art. 5(d)(v).
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under the ICESCR may entail positive steps and special measures
and include a prohibition against indirect, substantive
discrimination.'6 2 Article 5 of the ICERD mandates that states
prohibit and "eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms" and
guarantee equality and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of
human rights.6 3  It provides a non-exhaustive list of civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights that, in light of
developments in human rights law, arguably extends to all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including minority rights.164
Article 5(e)(v) specifies that the right to education and training is
one of the fundamental rights, which must be guaranteed without
racial or ethnic discrimination.16 5  The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has noted that this provision
requires an assessment of the impact of education and language
policies on the rights of minorities. The Committee's comments
also underscore the ICERD's dual concern with accommodation
and integration.166 In this regard, it has called on states to take
measures to protect minority languages while likewise facilitating
the acquisition of the majority language. The result will be a
realization of participation rights.167
III. Autonomy as a Framework for Balancing Identity and
Integration
This discussion of a human rights framework underpinned by
substantive equality reveals the potential of international human
162 See CESCR, General Comment No. 20, supra note 78, 1 8.
163 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 5.
164 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 27; see also Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 20: The Guarantee of Human
Rights Free From Racial Discrimination, art. 5, 1, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Mar. 15, 1996)
(observing that "the rights and freedoms mentioned in Article 5 do not constitute an
exhaustive list" and that "[mlost of these rights have been elaborated in the International
Covenants on Human Rights.").
165 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 5(e)(v).
166 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding
Observations: Latvia, 26, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.79 (Apr. 12, 2001).
167 See id. (urging the "[s]tate party to maintain the possibility to receive an
education in languages of various ethnic groups or to study those languages at different
levels of education, without prejudice for learning the official language, as well as of
using mother tongue in private and in public").
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rights law to contribute to the resolution of minority claims while
effectively balancing the demands of integration and
accommodation. Human rights can also provide the basis for
negotiating and designing measures that allow minorities to
exercise some degree of self-government within the confines of
the state.
Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have
responded to ethnic conflict and identity claims by establishing
regional autonomy mechanisms for geographically concentrated
minorities.168 Autonomy has become one strategy for preventing
and resolving tensions between governments and disaffected
groups. It can also serve to maintain the territorial integrity of
states while addressing the collective demands and rights of
particular communities.'69 Ghai, among others, has observed this
trend and notes that autonomy "has been seen as a panacea for
cultural diversity, and . .. seems to provide the path to maintaining
unity of a kind while conceding claims to self-government."'
Autonomy can support the collective rights of minority groups
because it provides the group concerned with the necessary space
and control over the development of its own culture, religion, or
language."' At the same time, autonomy can enhance the
participation of the group at the national level because it
strengthens the group's status vis-A-vis the majority, thereby
enabling a move towards achieving substantive equality.
A. Meaning ofAutonomy
Although international law does not define or recognize an
explicit right to autonomy, there is growing agreement about its
key features and the elements needed to ensure its efficacy in
mitigating competing interests. Both the flexible nature of
autonomy and the varying forms it may take in different situations
168 See Yash Ghai, Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis, in
AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES
1 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000).
169 Id. at 8, 24.
170 Id. at 1.
171 Yoram Dinstein, Autonomy (International Guarantees ofAutonomy), in BEYOND
A ONE-DIMENSIONAL STATE: AN EMERGING RIGHT TO AUTONOMY? 243-44 (Zelim A.
Skurbaty ed., 2005).
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add to autonomy's potential as a mechanism of conflict resolution.
This flexibility, however, also contributes to the elusiveness of its
definition. As Marc Weller observes, "there is no one generally
agreed definition of autonomy. Nevertheless, there is something
of a consensus relating to most aspects of autonomy." 7 2 Several
scholars have attempted to identify certain common features that
may be necessary to ensure the successful functioning of an
autonomy arrangement.17 3
Autonomy is often understood as a system that provides for the
devolution of power from a central government to a regional
authority allowing the regional government to exercise control
over matters directly relevant to that particular locality. 74 Ghai
defines autonomy as "a device to allow ethnic or other groups
claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of
special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity those
powers which cover common interests."' 75  Weller defines
territorial autonomy generally as "self-governance of a
demographically distinct territorial unit within the state.""7 These
arrangements are usually entrenched in peace treaties,
constitutions, and other forms of national legislation. 77
Weller includes several elements in his definition of territorial
autonomy which highlight autonomy's capacity to support
integration and participation as well as the protection of minority
identity. For example, Weller mentions that the autonomy
structure must reflect the demographic distinctiveness of the
dominant group, and, although it does not exercise separate
sovereignty, it can establish its own statute and maintain
172 Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission of the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, Towards a General Comment on Self-determination and Autonomy,
Working Paper Submitted by Marc Weller, Director, European Centre for Minority
Issues, 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/WP.5 (May 25, 2005); see also HANNUM,
supra note 19, at 4 (discussing various instances of autonomy).
173 See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Autonomy as a Strategy for Diffusing Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 483 (Paul Stem & Daniel
Druckman eds., 2000).
174 HANNUM, supra note 19, at 4.
175 Ghai, supra note 168, at 8.
176 Weller, supra note 172, at 5.
177 Id. at 5-6.
178 Id.
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significant powers "specifically defined in the autonomy law or
settlement."' 79 These powers, however, should also be "balanced
with tools that ensure the continued and effective integration of the
autonomous unit with the overall state" including "the guaranteed
representation of the autonomous unit in the structures of national
government."'so
B. Autonomy: Potential Tensions and Contradictions
Despite the promise of autonomy, its implementation has
revealed a number of inherent tensions and potential
contradictions. First, collective claims to greater autonomy are
frequently framed with reference to the right to self-determination
in international law, which has served as a legal basis for
collective claims as well as a powerful rhetorical device but has
nonetheless proven difficult to apply."' Because self-
determination is often associated with independence or
secessionist movements, states have sometimes viewed autonomy
with trepidation and remain unsure whether to reject or embrace
self-government measures as solutions to minority demands.'8 2
179 Id. at 6.
180 Id; see also HANNUM, supra note 19, at 467-68 (listing requirements for a "fully
autonomous" region including "a locally elected legislative body with some independent
legislative authority," "a locally selected chief executive, who may be . .. jointly
responsible to the local and central authorities," "an independent local judiciary with full
responsibility for interpreting local laws," and "power-sharing arrangements").
181 See generally Marc Weller, Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent
Developments, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 11l (2009) (reviewing self-determination settlements
negotiated since the Cold War). After World War 11, self-determination was applied
successfully to the process of decolonization of European colonies. Its explicit meaning
outside of the colonial context remains unclear, but scholars suggest there is a growing
acceptance of self-determination's internal dimension, closely linked with a right to
democratic participation. Since the end of the Cold War, many groups have relied upon
self-determination in their struggles for greater democratic participation and recognition
of rights within states. They have likewise relied on self-determination amidst ethnic and
nationalistic struggles for separation from states. This dichotomy is often referred to in
literature as "internal" and "external" self-determination. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL (1995). For a discussion of the
potential application of internal self-determination in the Tibetan context, see Kelley
Loper, The Right to Self-Determination: Recent Developments in International Law and
Their Relevance for the Tibetan People, 33 H. K. L. J. 167 (2003).
182 See STEFAN WOLFF & MARC WELLER, Self-determination and Autonomy: A
Conceptual Introduction, in AUTONOMY, SELF-GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 1, I (Marc
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Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller argue that until recently, states
were unlikely to agree to autonomy, believing that it was a
"dangerous concept that a state would only employ at its own
peril.""' In his study of settlements of self-determination
disputes, Weller notes that although "self-determination has
numerous layers of meaning" the doctrine has often been
perceived "as an all-or-nothing proposition."l 84 Since the end of
the Cold War, however, the number of internal ethnic conflicts in
which minority groups have claimed self-determination has risen
sharply, and states have become increasingly interested in
autonomy as a means of addressing minority interests and
avoiding secession.'
In addition, the prospect of autonomy raises concerns that
separation could entrench ethnic identity or become a tool of
control over the region rather than serve to protect a marginalized
culture.'8 6  On the other hand, encouraging integration, possibly
through participation in economic, social, and political activities,
may create common values between the autonomous areas and the
rest of the state; it may likewise dilute and destroy a distinctive
culture. In other words, autonomy displays several potentially
contradictory tendencies that could serve to either (1) preserve or
threaten the territorial integrity of states; (2) promote the
integration of ethnic groups or entrench ethnic identity; (3) ensure
minority rights protections or further marginalize communities;
and (4) resolve or increase the likelihood of conflict. Since
autonomy is usually an asymmetrical arrangement in which certain
regions or groups obtain self-government powers that may not be
available to other areas of the state, excluded groups may express
dissatisfaction.'8 7 Regional autonomy often creates new minority
groups within an autonomous entity that may face marginalization
Weller & Stefan Wolff eds., 2005); Weller, supra note 181, at 117.
183 WOLFF & WELLER, supra note 182; see also Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Potential
and Limitations, I INT'L J. ON GROUP RIGHTS 269, 289 (1994) (explaining the reasons
governments are often reluctant to grant autonomy).
184 Weller, supra note 181, at 112.
185 See WOLFF & WELLER, supra note 182, at 1-2.
186 See Ghai, supra note 168, at 24.
187 Id at 12-14.
[Vol. XXXVII34
TIBETAN AUTONOMY CLAIMS
by the new "majority" in the region.' In this sense, autonomy
could act as a form of control, isolation, or segregation as
understood in the ICERD, rather than a tool of integration.' Ghai
notes that autonomy may be a double-edged sword in this regard;
although it can be used to maintain unity within a state, it may also
separate communities on ethnic grounds and become an
entrenched system of discrimination.'90
C. Autonomy and Substantive Equality
As discussed above, the doctrine of substantive equality in
international law could guard against such an outcome while
supporting an autonomy regime that allows enough space for a
minority community to exercise identity rights. A regional
autonomy system separates a minority group from the rest of
society to some degree, and while it may therefore appear
inconsistent with a regime of individual rights (or equality's
traditional concern with individual freedom and uniform
treatment), such an interpretation reflects a constrained theory of
equality.19 ' Hurst Hannum observes that rather than segregate a
community, one purpose of autonomy is to provide a "means of
ensuring that a state is truly democratic, so that all significant
segments of society are able to participate effectively in the
political and economic decisions which affect their lives."' 92
Therefore, attention to substantive equality when establishing
autonomy may go some way in mitigating potential contradictions
and alleviating the root causes that fuel self-determination
movements. As Patrick Thornberry observes, "[i]n general, while
more elevated claims may be made on behalf of particular groups
for self-determination, it seems clear that lifting the burden of
basic discrimination enables groups and persons to stand taller and
express their authenticity."' 93 Substantive equality may also serve
188 See WOLFF & WELLER, supra note 182, at 16.
189 See ICERD, supra note 1.
190 Ghai, supra note 168, at 24-25.
191 See Hurst Hannum, The Right to Autonomy: Chimera or Solution?, in ETHNICITY
AND POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 287, 289 (Kumar Rupesinghe & Valery A.
Tishkov eds.,1996).
192 Id. at 288.
193 Thomberry, supra note 58, at 258.
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as an alternative or additional basis on which to support an
autonomy claim that could be more palatable to states than the
more explosive principle of self-determination.'94 Indeed, greater
autonomy may be a necessary means of realizing substantive
equality, especially in cases of severe systemic discrimination and
serious threats to minority identity.
IV. Minority Policy in China and the Tibetan Case
China has also attempted to manage ethnic diversity and
conflict through a constitutionally entrenched system of regional
ethnic autonomy which serves as the cornerstone of the country's
minority policy.19 5 Due to its potential to reconcile the need for
both integration and the protection of minority identity within a
human rights framework, substantive equality provides an
appropriate benchmark for evaluating these measures. This
section briefly reviews the Chinese framework, as well as minority
policies within the fields of language and education in particular.
It contends that the state's priorities of unity and stability-rather
than diversity-inform the current approach which has failed to
rectify structural inequalities between certain minority
communities and the majority. The state has thus not achieved the
appropriate balance between integration and the protection of
identity required by international human rights standards.
The Tibetans as a group continue to experience substantive
discrimination, marginalization, and threats to their cultural
identity.19 6 The Tibetan situation is an example of an especially
intractable ethnic conflict in the Asian region, and it has eluded
any real resolution. A series of talks has failed to produce results,
and ethnic riots in March 2008, coupled with the continuing
suppression of dissent, highlight the persistence and potentially
explosive nature of the problem.' 97  The extent of systemic
194 See generally id. (discussing claims and self-determination).
195 See MacPherson & Beckett, supra note 9, at 104.
196 See ANDREW MARTIN FISCHER, STATE GROWTH AND SOCIAL ExCLUSION IN TIBET:
CHALLENGES OF RECENT ECONOMIC GROWTH xv (2005).
197 Envoys of the Dalai Lama have met with representatives of the Chinese
leadership in a series of nine meetings since 2002. For information on the ninth round of
talks held in January 2010, see the Statement by Special Envoy of his Holiness the Dalai
Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation which Visited China in Jan. 2010 (Feb.
2, 2010), available at
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inequalities faced by the Tibetan people has been well-
documented.'98 For example, Andrew Martin Fischer, in a study
on state growth and social exclusion in Tibet, points out that the
"Tibetan areas of western China have among the highest poverty
rates in China, the highest urban-rural inequality and by far the
worst education indicators."l 99  To address these issues, it is
critical to identify effective solutions which mitigate competing
priorities while complying with China's international human rights
obligations.
A. The Chinese Framework for Minority Protection
China's framework for regional ethnic autonomy is set out in
Section 6 of the Chinese Constitution and is elaborated on in the
Autonomy Law.20 0 Article 4 of the Constitution provides
generally that "[r]egional autonomy is practised in areas where
people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities;
in these areas organs of self-government are established to
exercise the power of autonomy. All national autonomous areas
are integral parts of the People's Republic of China."20 '
Autonomous areas enjoy some degree of autonomous legislative
powers, including the power to modify national laws to suit local
circumstances as well as to adopt their own "autonomy
regulations."2 02
The Constitution also guarantees a range of minority rights
including "the freedom [for minorities] to use and develop their
own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their
own folkways and customs." 2 03  In relation to education, the
Autonomy Law provides that the organs of self-government in
http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=120&articletype=press&rmenuid=morepress&tab=
2#TabbedPanelsl. For an overview of the history of the Tibetan conflict and the case for
genuine autonomy based on international legal standards, see Michael C. Davis, The
Quest for Self-Rule in Tibet, 18 J. OF DEMOCRACY 157 (2007) and Michael C. Davis,
Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet, 30 HuM. RTS. Q. 227 (2008).
198 See generally FISCHER, supra note 196 (summarizing extensive research on the
socio-economic disparity of the Tibetan people).
I99 Id. at xv.
200 XIANFA, supra note 20, § 6.
201 Id. art. 4.
202 See id. art. 116.
203 Id. art. 4.
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autonomous regions may decide "on plans for the development of
education in these areas, on the establishment of various kinds of
schools at different levels, and on their educational system, forms,
curricula, the language used in instruction and enrollment
procedures."20 4 In addition to autonomy and specified
constitutional rights, the Chinese government's minority policies
include affirmative action measures that grant the Tibetans access
to certain opportunities, such as special admissions criteria for
tertiary education.205 The government has also promoted
economic modernization and provided educational subsidies in
minority regions.0
In practice, however, China's state-building and modernization
priorities have limited the implementation of regional autonomy
and the impact of these special measures.20 7 Autonomy powers
and minority rights must be understood and exercised within the
overall constitutional context that emphasizes unity, respect for
territorial integrity, and a hierarchical structure of governance.2 08
The Preamble of the Constitution affirms that China "is a unitary
multi-national State created jointly by the people of all its
nationalities. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual
assistance have been established among the nationalities and will
continue to be strengthened."20 9 Seonaigh MacPherson and
Gulbahar Beckett note that these principles promote assimilation
instead of the multicultural values of "diversity" and "ethnic
identification." 210 Ghai observes that the "leadership's obsession
204 Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy, supra
note 21, art. 36.
205 See INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, CHINA'S ETHNIC POLICY AND COMMON PROSPERITY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ALL
ETHNIC GROUPS (Sept. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7078073.htm.
206 Id.
207 See generally MacPherson & Beckett, supra note 9 (discussing how autonomy
efforts have not succeeded).
208 XIANFA, supra note 20, at Prmbl.
209 Id
210 MacPherson & Beckett, supra note 9, at 104; see INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE
STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, SIXTY YEARS SINCE PEACEFUL
LIBERATION OF TIBET, ch. II, 3 (July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-07/ll/contentI 904075.htm; INFORMATION
OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PROGRESS IN
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with state sovereignty" closely relates to its "preference for a
unitary state, despite China's huge size and diverse population"
and that this concern about sovereignty "prevents a significant
constitutional accommodation of ethnic and political diversity."2 1 1
Indeed, evidence suggests that the constitutional autonomy powers
have been underutilized as a result of these priorities. 212  For
example, the Tibet Autonomous Region has been unable to enact
its own autonomy regulations despite previous attempts, and
autonomous regions have been impeded from using their powers
to modify national legislation.2 13
Despite limitations of autonomy in China, the Tibetan
government-in-exile has framed its demands for greater autonomy
within the existing legal framework.2 14 In October 2008, Tibetan
envoys of the Dalai Lama-the Tibetan's exiled spiritual leader-
CHINA's HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2009, ch. V (Sept. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.gov.cnlenglish/official/2010-09/26/content_1709982.htm (describing how
these principles are used in Chinese government discourse on Tibet and minority rights).
211 Yash Ghai, Autonomy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnic and Economic
Diversity, in AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-
ETHNIC STATES 77, 78 (Yash Ghai ed., 2000).
212 See XIANFA, supra note 20, arts. 112 & 116 (defining the autonomy powers);
Ghai, supra note 211, at 85.
213 See Yash Ghai & Sophia Woodman, Unused Powers: Contestation over
Autonomy Legislation in the PRC, 82 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 29 (2009); see also Chunli Xia,
Autonomous Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People's Republic of
China: The Law and the Reality, in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS
- PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION 541, 559 (Jorge Oliveira & Paula Cardinal eds., 2009)
(noting the "intensive interference" of the Chinese Communist Party in the autonomous
legislative process); Guobin Zhu & Lingyun Yu , Regional Minority Autonomy in the
PRC: A Preliminary Appraisal from a Historical Perspective, 7 INT'L J. MINORITY &
GROUP RTS. 39, 54-55 (2000) (identifying the discrepancy between how regions may
constitutionally enact autonomous self-regulations but no regulations have been adopted
"at the level of national autonomous regions"). See generally Yash Ghai et al., Is There
Space for 'Genuine Autonomy'for Tibetan Areas in the PRC's System of Nationalities
Regional Autonomy?, 17 INT'L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 137 (2010) (discussing
whether Tibetan demands can be met within the framework of regional ethnic autonomy
in China).
214 See generally Baogang He & Barry Sautman, The Politics of the Dalai Lama's
New Initiative for Autonomy, 78 PAC. AFF. 601 (2006) (explaining what the Dalai Lama
did); Baogang He, The Dalai Lama's Autonomy Proposal: A One-Sided Wish?, in
CONTEMPORARY TIBET: POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIETY IN A DISPUTED REGION 67
(Barry Sautman & June Teufel Dreyer eds., 2006) (discussing the Dalai Lama's
approach).
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presented a Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan
People (hereinafter "Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy") in
their eighth round of discussions with Beijing since 2002.215 The
document sets out the Tibetan proposal for a "Middle Way
Approach" as the basis for negotiations on the future of Tibet.216
The proposal claims that the Tibetans "remain firmly committed
not to seek separation or independence" and that "a solution to the
Tibetan problem through genuine autonomy" is compatible with
"the principles of autonomy" in the Chinese Constitution.217 The
Chinese-side responded to this document through a "signed
article" published by Xinhua, the official news agency.218 The
article characterized the Memorandum in Genuine Autonomy as an
"attempt ... to set up a 'half independent' or 'covertly
independent' political entity controlled by the Dalai clique on soil
that occupies one quarter of the Chinese territory, and when
conditions are ripe, they will seek to realize 'total Tibet
independence."' 219 This concern with separatism and suspicion of
the Tibetans' autonomy agenda exemplifies Wolf s and Weller's
observation that many states view autonomy with trepidation. 22 0 It
also raises questions about whether an autonomy system that
simultaneously promotes identity and participation is workable in
the Chinese context.
B. Approaches to Minority Language and Education
A review of language and education policies, especially as
they apply to Tibet, leads to similar conclusions. 221' Language
215 MEMORANDUM ON GENUINE AUTONOMY FOR THE TIBETAN PEOPLE, available at
http://www.tibetoffice.ch/web/mwa/memorandum/english.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2011).
216 Id. at 1.
217 Id
218 Yiduo, Signed Article: On the "Memorandum" of the Dalai Clique, Xinhua
News Agency (Nov. 21, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
11/21/content_10391968.htm.
219 Id
220 Weller, supra note 181, at 117.
221 See Kelley Loper, Minority Language Rights and Education in China: The
Relevance of Human Rights Law and Substantive Equality, in CHINA'S ASSIMILATIONIST
LANGUAGE POLICY: THE IMPACT ON INDIGENOUS/MINORITY LITERACY AND SOCIAL
HARMONY 207 (Gulbahar Beckett & Gerard Postiglione eds.) (forthcoming 2011)
(discussing minority language rights in education in China). See generally CHINA'S
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learning and education have profound implications for the
protection of ethnic identity, as well as for the ability of members
of minority groups to access opportunities. A consideration of
policies in these areas, therefore, highlights the difficulties
involved in realizing substantive equality for the Tibetans and in
balancing integration and accommodation priorities. For example,
the dilution of the Tibetan language impacts cultural identity,
while the need to learn putonghua in a Han dominated society for
pragmatic reasons creates pressure to assimilate. This section also
raises questions about the content of education and whether the
curriculum can achieve the pluralistic aims articulated in the CRC
and other human rights instruments as discussed in Section II.
The Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy emphasizes the
significance of Tibetan language and places language at the
forefront of the Tibetans' basic needs.222 It explains that
"[1]anguage is the most important attribute of the Tibetan people's
identity" and "in order for Tibetans to use and develop their own
language, [it] must be respected as the main spoken and written
language. Similarly, the principal language of the Tibetan
autonomous areas needs to be Tibetan."223 The Memorandum on
Genuine Autonomy argues that education will help influence the
realization of these objectives in relation to language and cultural
identity as well as the balance between integration and
accommodation.224 Reinforcing this proposition, Rebecca Clothey
notes that "schools serve not only the economic but also the
political integration needs of nation-states" and, therefore, "the
education system provides an arena within which to view the
relations between national and ethnic identities."'225 She observes
that the challenge for all education systems is to "help minorities
to gain access to a social and economic system that is dominated
ASSIMILATIONIST LANGUAGE POLICY: THE IMPACT ON INDIGENOUS/MINORITY LITERACY
AND SOCIAL HARMONY (Gulbahar Beckett & Gerard Postiglione eds.) (forthcoming
2011) (discussing language policy in China and its tendency to promote assimilation).
222 MEMORANDUM ON GENUINE AUTONOMY FOR THE TIBETAN PEOPLE, supra note
215, § IV, 1.
223 Id.
224 Id. T 4.
225 Rebecca Clothey, China's Policies for Minority Nationalities in Higher
Education: Negotiating National Values and Ethnic Identities, 49 CoMP. EDUC. REV.
389, 389 (2005).
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by the values of the majority while, at the same time, retaining
their separate ethnic group cultures and identities." 2 26 Anwei Feng
adds the insight that "there is potentially a vicious cycle in which
social stratification can be exacerbated by inappropriate language
policies, which may result in more severe inequality in education,
and in turn lead to further social and ethnic divisiveness."22 7
Like the regional ethnic autonomy framework, Chinese
policies related to minority languages and education must be
understood in connection with broader state objectives, including
the goals of national unity, state-building, modernization and
economic development. These priorities shape the central
government's response to real or perceived separatist movements,
especially in Tibetan and Uighur regions.22 8 Clothey notes that
China's affirmative action policies, such as bilingual education
and quotas admitting minorities to universities, "have the ultimate
aim of ensuring ethnic stability, national integration, and economic
development in minority areas."229 In her review of education
policy in Tibet, Catriona Bass explains that China's primary
education objectives have been "to encourage political allegiance
towards China and enhance stability in border areas"230 and to
promote "a sense of commitment to the unity of China." 231 In
other words, these measures are not designed to preserve minority
identity as such. Therefore, the measures may not fulfill the
ICERD requirement to ensure substantive equality by "advancing"
the status of the group vis-A-vis the majority to support both
minority identity and integration in the sense of participation.2 32
Scholars have highlighted the impact of China's renewed
promotion of putonghua-an approach fueled by the state
priorities mentioned above-on language policy in education and
226 Id.
227 Anwei Feng, English in China: Convergence and Divergence in Policy and
Practice, in MULTILINGUAL, GLOBALIZING ASIA, 85, 98-9 (Lisa Lim & Ee-Ling Low
eds., 22 AILA REV., 2009).
228 See generally Clothey, supra note 225 (describing how educational policies
inform the government's response).
229 Id at 389.
230 CATRIONA BASS, EDUCATION IN TIBET: POLICY AND PRACTICE SINCE 1950 10
(1998).
231 Id at 3.
232 ICERD, supra note 1, art. 1, 1 4.
[Vol. XXXVII42
TIBETAN AUTONOMY CLAIMS
minorities' access to opportunities.2 33 While this could potentially
support integration and participation, it could also result in
assimilation and the dilution of ethnic identity and language
rights.2 34 Indeed, the growing emphasis on putonghua reflects, in
part, the practical reality that the state language is dominant, and
its acquisition is necessary to access higher educational and
employment opportunities.23 5
Minglang Zhou explains that the new Chinese language order
"treats putonghua, or Han, as the superlanguage, and reserves for
it most public functions and political, legal, financial, and human
resources while politically and functionally marginalizing minority
languages."23 6 He notes that this order is reflected in the
Autonomy Law and other laws such as the 2001 New PRC
National Commonly Used Language and Script Law.237
Stephen Carney also observes that recent Chinese education
reforms based on international models emphasizing student-
centered learning are designed to meet the needs of market
reforms that remain a key linchpin of China's modernization
strategy. In Tibet, however, "the gradual shift to Chinese as the
language of instruction from grade 3 for all subjects except
Tibetan language studies was viewed by teachers in different rural
schools as one significant problem in engaging all pupils, and
limited enormously the possibilities for the new teaching
233 See generally Shuang Zhang, China's Bilingual Education Policy and Current
Use of Miao in Schools, 41 CHINESE EDUc. & Soc'Y 28 (2008) (analyzing the problems
with minority language teaching); Yuming Li , Humankind's Three Major Language
Topics Today and the State of China's Linguistic Life, 41 CHINESE EDUC. & Soc'Y 15
(2008) (explaining the new strategy of putonghua promotion).
234 See generally Clothey, supra note 225 (explaining that ethnic groups may
perceive language policies as harmful).
235 See id. at 393.
236 Minglang Zhou, Linguistic Diversity and Language Harmony in Contemporary
China, 41 CHINESE EDUC. & Soc'Y 3, 5-6 (2008) (explaining that the new language order
replaced the previous socialist model which envisioned minority languages as "satellites"
each "having its own perimeter of functions and resources" around the majority Han
language).
237 Id. at 6 (explaining that the 2001 Autonomy Law revisions require that
putonghua be taught at earlier stages of education than was previously the case in
minority regions).
238 Stephen Carney, Learner-centred Pedagogy in Tibet: International Education
Reform in a Local Context, 44 CoMP. EDUC. 39, 39 (2008).
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methodology."2 39
Another education policy that potentially impacts language
rights (and implicates substantive equality) is the practice of
sending Tibetan students to boarding schools outside of Tibetan
240regions. MacPherson and Beckett point out that this relocation
of students dislocates Tibetans both culturally and
geographically.2 4 1 Putonghua is taught in these classes, and
students may also be required to learn English as a foreign
language.2 42  While Tibetan is offered as a separate subject, the
study of Tibetan language and literature has not been promoted.24 3
One student in Postiglione's study remarked that Tibetan language
did not seem "useful"; another felt that the language was not "a
'common tool' of communication in 'modern society."'
2 44
C. China's Interaction with Human Rights Treaty Bodies
When interacting with the Chinese government through the
state reporting process, human rights treaty bodies such as the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have raised
issues related to the implementation of autonomy as well as
minority language and education policies.2 45 They have therefore
239 Id.
240 See Gerard Postiglione, Dislocated Education: The Case of Tibet, 53 CoMP.
EDUC. REv. 483, 483 (2009). But see id at 484 (arguing that that Tibetan students sent
to boarding schools "acculturated to the Chinese mainstream, but usually on their own
terms. That is, they did not become less assertive in their ethnicity, though the paucity of
knowledge about Tibetan language and cultural heritage provided by the schools made
this a formidable challenge.").
241 MacPherson & Beckett, supra note 9, at 115; see also Gerard Postiglione, Ben
Jiao & Manlaji, Language in Tibetan Education: The Case of the Neidiban, in
BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN CHINA: PRACTICES, POLICIES AND CONCEPTS 49 (Anwei Feng
ed., 2007).
242 Postiglione, supra note 240, at 501; see also Feng, supra note 227, at 91
(discussing the impact of English language learning on minority education).
243 Postiglione, supra note 240, at 501.
244 Id. (explaining that other students felt that the schools should emphasize Tibetan
language to a greater extent).
245 See generally Turkmenistan, supra note 68; CRC, supra note 14; Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: China (including
Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions), U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/CHN/CO/10-13 (Sept. 15, 2009) (describing how China's autonomy policies
have functioned).
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clarified that these measures implicate China's international
human rights obligations.24 6
For example, in its Concluding Observations on China's report
in 2009, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination expressed concern in relation to ICERD Article 5
that "in practice [putonghua] is the sole language of instruction in
many schools in the autonomous minority provinces, especially at
secondary and higher levels of education" and that teaching in
putonghua alone is connected to the "remaining disparities for
ethnic minority children in accessing education."24 7 The
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights asked
questions about reports that the right to the "use and teaching of
minority languages, history and culture" in the Tibetan
Autonomous Region has not been fully realized.248 The
Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that China
"take all necessary measures to ensure the full implementation of
the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Act" and that it make "all teaching
and learning materials for the primary and secondary level...
available in ethnic minority languages and with culturally sensitive
content."249
These comments about the impact of language and education
on the ability of minority communities to enjoy human rights
without discrimination further underscores the requirement that
states interpret these instruments and their obligations according to
a substantive theory.
V. Conclusion
Indeed, international human rights law elaborates a principle
of substantive equality that can offer guidance to states when
attempting to develop effective minority policies like self-
government arrangements. This principle requires that states take
positive measures such as those conceptualized by the ICERD to
achieve substantive equality.2 50 Determining the existence of
246 Id.
247 Turkmenistan, supra note 68, 22.
248 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations:
People's Republic of China, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.107, 38 (May 13, 2005).
249 CRC, supra note 14, % 45, 77(d).
250 See ICERD, supra note 1.
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discrimination, which measures might be needed, and how they
should be implemented depends on the context, especially the
degree of marginalization faced by a particular group, and can be
analyzed with reference to substantive equality aims. Autonomy
and self-government arrangements can enhance minority access to
rights related to cultural identity and participation.
A system providing greater autonomy-devised according to
international standards and measured against a substantive
equality principle-could more effectively mitigate ethnic conflict
in Tibetan regions. This may be the most appropriate response to
the past and ongoing discrimination faced by the Tibetans-
discrimination which has been exacerbated by the dominance of
the majority culture and the state's political priorities, and which
has undermined the Tibetans' equal enjoyment of identity rights.
Autonomy that is properly framed and implemented would allow a
community a greater degree of freedom to make and implement
decisions affecting its culture, language, religion, and way of life.
This type of autonomy could, perhaps ironically, enhance both
inclusion and participation.
Substantive equality mandates both accommodation and full
participation in a given situation.2 5 ' These two objectives are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, but, in fact, could be mutually
reinforcing. Fostering Tibetan culture through accommodation,
including a self-governing autonomy regime, could lead to greater
"equalization" of the minority culture, and this could allow fuller
participation and access more generally without assimilation.
China's increasing interaction with the international human rights
system creates possibilities that a substantive equality principle
could influence the domestic discourse on minority rights. It
could also provide support for Tibetan demands for greater
autonomy and protection of their cultural heritage within the
framework of the Chinese state while ensuring a right to
participation for Tibetans in Chinese society generally.
251 See generally FREDMAN, supra note 24 (arguing for accommodation and
participation as objectives of substantive equality theory).
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